Aggregate Implications of Child-Related Transfers with Means Testing

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Child-related transfers in Australia

1. Family transfers $\approx$ 2% of GDP over the past decade.
2. 70% of family transfers comprises two child-related transfers:
   - Family Tax Benefit (FTB Part A and Part B)
   - Child Care Subsidy (CCS)
3. Some highlights:
   - Generous (Average \$8,000); ◂ Ext margin: FTB ◂ Ext margin: CCS
   - Significant (up to 40% of income for Q1 and Q2); ◂ FTB inc. share
   - Not mutually exclusive; ◂ Child care usage
   - Means-tested (joint inc. + demographic); ◂ FTB ◂ CCS
   - CCS tests work hours, FTB does not.

*See Budget Paper 1: Budget Strategy and Outlook page *6-26*

An example of means-tested benefit schedule



This paper

- Revisit an open question

  "*Should child-related transfers be means-tested or universal?*"

- Trade-offs in designing child-related transfer
  - *Economy-wide*: Welfare vs Efficiency (Output, labor supply)
  - *Between groups*: Beneficiaries vs Non-beneficiaries (Equity)
  - *Life cycle*: Short-term benefits vs Lost earnings

- Our approach
  - Data: document the stylized facts using HILDA 2001-2020;
  - Model: develop a structural model for counterfactual analysis.

Overview of findings

1. *Should child-related transfers be universal?*
   - YES $\rightarrow$ Efficiency gains $\rightarrow$ output and welfare improvements
   - NO $\rightarrow$ High tax burden$\rightarrow$ single mothers lose
   - Means-testing controls fiscal cost $\rightarrow$ positive outcomes

2. *Could the existing means-tested system be improved*?
   - Incremental reform: Relaxing the CCS phase-out rate!

3. *Should child-related transfers be removed?*
   - YES $\rightarrow$ Large efficiency gains
   - NO $\rightarrow$ Significant welfare losses for single mothers

Related literature

1. Fiscal policy and female labor supply
   - Child-related transfers: Guner et al. (2020); Guner et al. (2023)
   - Taxation: Blundell et al. (1998); Eissa and Hoynes (2004); Guner et al. (2012); Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2018)
   - Joint benefits of social security: Kaygusuz (2015); Nishiyama (2019); Borella et al. (2020)

2. Government transfers with means testing
   - Social security: Feldstein (1987);
   - Age pension: Tran and Woodland (2014);
   - Social insurance: Braun et al. (2017)

3. Australia: Fiscal policy, labor supply and macro aggregates
   - Micro/empirical studies: Doiron and Kalb (2004); Gong and Breunig (2017); Herault and Kalb (2022)
   - Macro/public finance studies: Tran and Woodland (2014); Kudrna et al. (2022); Tran and Zakariyya (2022); Tin and Tran (2023)

See literature on other economic and social impacts of child benefits.

Stylized Facts

Fact 1: FTB as an important income source (1)



Fact 1: FTB as an important income source (2)



Fact 2: Age profiles of participation





Fact 2: Age profiles of full-time employment share





Fact 3: Earnings gaps over the life cycle



Fact 4: High Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)

Young mother with: two children, low ed, **husband earning** $\$60,000$

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

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

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

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

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Young mother with: two children, low ed, **husband earning** $\$60,000$



Fact 4: High Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)

Part-time young mother with: two children, low ed, **single**



Fact 4: High Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)

Young mother with: two children, low education, husband earning $\$120,000$



Fact 5: Non-linear EMTR over the life cycle:

Stay-at-home young mother: low ed, median income husband



Fact 5: Non-linear EMTR over the life cycle:

Young mother: two children, low ed, **husband earning** $60,000



Model

Model overview

A dynamic general equilibrium, overlapping generations (OLG) model

1. Heterogeneous households
   - State vector = {age (j), family type (λ), assets (a), female human capital (h), education (θ), uninsurable transitory shocks (ϵ^m, ϵ^f)};
   - Child-related costs (time + money);
   - Longevity risk;
   - Exogenous male labor supply;
   - **Joint decisions**: c, a^+ and female labor participation, $\ell \in \{0, 1, 2\}$;
2. A representative firm with Cobb-Douglas technology;
3. Government commits to balance the budget every period:
   - Income tax, corporate tax, consumption tax, borrowing;
   - General expenditure, age pension, FTB, CCS, debt service.
4. Market structure: A small open economy taking the world interest rate as given.

Households: Low-education (θ_L)

(Working age)



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

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

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

Households: Low-education (θ_L)

(Working age)



Households: Low-education (θ_L)

(Working age)



Households: Low-education (θ_L)

(Retirement)



Households: High-education (θ_H)

(Working age + Retirement)



Summary: Internally Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Value	Target
Households		
Discount factor	$\beta = 0.99$	Saving 5%-8% (ABS 2013-2018)
Taste for consumption	$\nu = 0.375$	LFP for mothers = 68-72%
Fixed time cost of work	$\{\chi_p, \chi_f\} = \{0.1125,\ 0.0525\}$	Second half of LFP and FT profiles
Human cap. gain rates	$(\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell};\ \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell})$	Male age profiles of wages
Human cap. deprec.	$\delta_h = 0.074$	Gender wage gap age 50 (HILDA)
Technology		
Capital depreciation rate	$\delta = 0.07172$	$\frac{K}{Y} = 3.2$ (ABS, 2012-2018)
Transitory shocks, ϵ		
Persistence	$\rho = 0.98$	Literature
Variance of shocks	$\sigma^2_\epsilon = 0.0145$	Gini of male earnings at age 21, $GINI_{j=1,m} = 0.35$
Fiscal policy		
Maximum pension	$pen^{max} = 30\% \times Y_m$	$\frac{\mathcal{P}_t}{Y_t} = 3.2\%$ (ABS, 2012-2018)

◂ Externally calibrated parameters

Key Macro Variables: Model vs. Data

Moments	Model	Data	Source
Targeted			
Capital, K/Y	3.2	3-3.3	ABS (2012-2018)
Savings, S/Y	4.7%	5-8%	ABS (2013-2018)
Mothers' LFP	72.57%	68-72%	HILDA (2012-2018)
Consumption tax, T^C/Y	4.23%	4.50%	APH Budget Review
Corporate tax, T^K/Y	4.25%	4.25%	APH Budget Review
Age Pension, P/Y	3.65%	3.20%	ABS (2012-2018)
Gini (male aged 21)	0.35	0.35	HILDA (2012-2018)
Non-targeted			
Consumption, C/Y	52.80%	54-58%	ABS (2012-2018)
Investment, I/Y	32.29%	24-28%	ABS (2013-2018)
Mothers' full-time share	50.32%	50%	HILDA (2012-2018)
Scale parameter, ζ	0.7417	0.7237	Tran and Zakariyya 2021
Income tax, T^I/Y	14.93%	11%	APH Budget Review
Tax revenue to output	28.36%	25%	ABS(2012-2018)
FTB + CCS	1.7%	1.45%	ABS (2012-2018)

Table 1: Key macroeconomic variables: Model vs. Data moments

Life cycle profile of labour supply: Model vs. Data



Figure: **Model vs Data: Life-cycle profiles of labor force participation and full-time share of employment of mothers.**

Quantitative Analysis

Counterfactural policy experiments

1. Experiment A: Should child-related transfers be universal?
   - Structural reform: Baseline universal child benefits
   - Fine-tune by adjusting benefit payments

2. Experiment B: Could the existing means-tested system be improved?
   - Incremental reforms via small adjustment

3. Experiment C: Should child-related transfers be removed?
   - Radical reforms

Experiment A: Baseline universal child-related transfers

Aggregate implications of universal FTB and CCS programs

CCS size, %	+129.45	Hour, %	+6.71
FTB size, %	+281.40	Human cap. (H), %	+2.09
Average tax rate, *pp*	+4.20	Consumption (C), %	+0.04
Fe. LFP, *pp*	+2.64	Output (Y), %	+0.11
Fe. Full time, *pp*	+4.39	Welfare (EV), %	+0.85

Table 3: Overall efficiency and welfare effects of universalizing the FTB and the CCS

	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Welfare (%)	+1.36	+1.34	−1.47	−1.20	−0.69	−0.51

Table 4: Heterogeneous welfare effects of universal child-related transfers

Experiment A: Baseline universal child-related transfers

(Labor supply and human capital changes by demographic)



Experiment A: Baseline universal child-related transfers

(Consumption and wealth responses by demographic)



Experiment A: Baseline universal child-related transfers

Summary of findings

Pros: **Efficiency and welfare gains**:

1. Work incentive effect due to reduced EMTRs dominates;
2. Married households win:
   - Improved self-insurance via labor supply and savings;
   - Better allocation of labor supply. More leisure taken in their 50s;
   - Higher consumption at young age when MU_c is high and face credit constraint;
3. Reform supported by the majority.

Experiment A: Baseline universal child-related transfers

Summary of findings

Cons: **Inequitable redistribution**:

1. Significant tax burden;
2. Hurts single mothers, the intended beneficiaries.
   - Universal transfers fail to compensate for decreased after-tax earnings over the life cycle;
   - Limited self-insurance via work and savings;
   - Lack family insurance.
3. Inequitable redistribution problem is not resolved with smaller universal benefit rates.

◂ Universal programs varied by benefit rates ◂ Incremental reforms

Experiment A: Different univeral payment rates

(Welfare changes by demographic)



◂ Baseline universal: Summary of findings

Experiment B: Incremental reforms

Aggregate implications of incremental reforms

	FTB taper rates		CCS taper rates	
	$0.5 \times \omega^F$	$1.5 \times \omega^F$	$0.5 \times \omega^C$	$1.5 \times \omega^C$
Tax rate, *pp*	+2.08	+3.34	−0.97	+1.28
Fe. LFP, *pp*	+1.69	−2.94	+0.17	−2.66
Fe. Hour, %	+1.13	−5.47	+1.00	−5.32
Fe. Human Cap, %	+0.76	−2.21	+0.22	−2.49
Cons. (C), %	+1.36	−1.55	+0.46	−2.06
Output (Y), %	+0.81	−1.67	**+0.89**	−1.42
Welfare (EV), %	−0.44	−1.41	**+0.37**	−0.61

Table 6: Efficiency and welfare effects of incremental reforms to taper rates.

	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Welfare (%)	+0.42	+0.40	+0.34	+0.24	+0.26	+0.18

Table 7: Heterogeneous welfare outcomes from halving the CCS taper rates.

Experiment B: Incremental reforms

(Labor supply responses by demographic)



Experiment B: Incremental reforms

(Consumption responses by demographic)



Experiment B: Incremental reforms

Summary of findings

Relaxing the CCS taper rates results in:

1. $+0.37\%$ overall welfare;
2. $+0.89\%$ aggregate output;
3. Lower tax burden and taper rate of CCS reduce EMTR
4. More evenly spread welfare gains. Everyone wins.

However, for the majority (married households):

1. Universal FTB and CCS: $+1.3\%$ welfare
2. Relaxing CCS taper rates: $+0.4\%$ welfare

$\Longrightarrow$ The universal system might still secure the most votes.

Experiment C: Removing child-related transfers

	[1] No FTB	[2] No CCS	[3] No FTB & CCS
CCS size, %	+49.80	–	–
FTB size, %	–	+10.89	–
Average tax rate, *pp*	+2.50	−0.70	+0.99
Fe. Lab. For. Part. (LFP), *pp*	+5.76	−10.00	+10.49
Fe. Full time (FT), *pp*	+9.21	−4.55	+20.38
Human cap. (H), %	+3.88	−4.83	+8.57
Consumption (C), %	+1.10	−3.26	+4.27
Output (Y), %	+1.38	−3.48	+3.86
Welfare, %	−3.70	−1.00	−0.66*

Table 1: Efficiency and welfare effects of eliminating child-related transfer program(s)

	Couples (H)	Couples (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Welfare (%)	+1.35	−0.22	+0.02	+0.06	−4.03	−6.53

Table 2: Welfare effects by demographic of removing FTB and CCS

Experiment C: Removing child-related transfers



Experiment C: Removing child-related transfers

Summary of findings

An economy without child-related transfers:

- Efficiency gain (female labor supply + human cap), but welfare loss.
- Redistributional consequence:
  - → Winners: High-educated couples and single males
  - → Small losers: Low-educated couples
  - → Big losers: Single mothers
- Opposed by the majority.

Why single mothers lose?

1. Increased labor income fails to replace the lost transfers;
2. Limited self-insurance (work and savings) for consumption smoothing;
3. Lack family insurance (via spousal income);
4. Credit constraint.

Conclusion

Key takeaways:

- Universal transfers increase tax burden, potentially harming beneficiaries;
- Means-testing ensures benefits are not outweighed by lost lifetime earnings, delivering a positive welfare outcome for the targeted groups;

Important points for quantitative work:

- Family structure and life cycle dynamics are crucial for assessing the impact of child-related transfers;
- Policy interactions and general equilibrium effects (via tax) matter.

◂ Caveats
◂ Future work

Appendix

Caveats

We abstract from, just to name a few:

1. Labor market and political frictions;
2. Administrative overhead of a complex welfare system;
3. Intensive margin of female labor supply decisions;
4. Male labor supply decisions;
5. Child-less married households and child-less single women;
6. Fertility, education and marriage/divorce decisions;
7. Welfare analysis along the transitional dynamics;
8. Joint optimization over the tax and transfer systems.

Future work

Planned expansion:

1. Endogenize intensive margin of female labour supply;
2. Endogenize male labor supply;
3. Richer income process (See De Nardi et al. (2020));
4. More detailed policy experiments;
5. Optimal tax and transfer policy;
6. Child quality.

Universal programs varied by benefit rates (1)

	Universal programs varied by benefit rates (1)		
	0.5×Baseline rates	Baseline rates	1.5×Baseline rates
CCS size, %	−15.45	+129.45	+207.27
FTB size, %	+132.56	+281.40	+430.23
Average tax rate, *pp*	+0.15	+4.20	+6.13
Fe. Lab. For. Part. (LFP), *pp*	+1.06	+2.64	+3.91
Fe. Full time (FT), *pp*	+0.23	+4.39	+6.29
Human cap. (H), %	+0.40	+2.09	+3.09
Consumption (C), %	−0.03	+0.04	+0.08
Output (Y), %	+0.16	+0.11	+0.11
Welfare (EV), %	+0.27	+0.85	+1.50

Table: **Aggregate efficiency and welfare effects of universal child-related transfers varied by size**

◂ Main Section: Universal programs varied by size

Universal programs varied by benefit rates (3)

(Labor supply responses by demographic)



Universal programs varied by benefit rates (4)

(Consumption changes by demographic)



Universal programs varied by benefit rates (5): Summary of findings

Varying the benefit rates does NOT resolve the inequity issue.

- Larger universal benefits: High tax burden. Single mothers lose.
  1. Lack family insurance;
  2. Costly self-insurance;
  3. Transfers cover short duration, and fail to replace the lost take-home income.
- Contraction:Low-education couples lose.
  1. Sustained increased in labor and consumption after 30, but
  2. Credit constraint;
  3. Cannot earn enough to replace lost transfers at age 21-30.
- Means-testing is necessary to ensure a net positive lifetime outcome for the intended beneficiaries.

Literature: broader economic and social impacts

1. Fertility
   - No effect for incremental benefits: Kearney (2004)
   - Small positive effect: Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2003); Bauernschuster et al. (2016); Bick (2016)

2. Marriage/Divorce
   - Theory of marriage: Becker (1973, 1974);
   - Small or statistically insignificant effects: Alm and Whittington (1999); Moffitt (1994); Williamson Hoynes (1997); Bitler et al. (2004)

3. Child quality and long-run outcomes
   - Early childhood investment: Heckman (2006); Hoynes et al. (2016)
   - Child benefits: Milligan and Stabile (2011); Dahl and Lochner (2012)

4. Interaction between marriage/divorce and child quality
   - Heckman and Masterov (2007)

◂ Related literature

Demographics

- Time-invariant pop. growth rate (n) and survival prob. (ψ_j^m, ψ_j^f);
- Households born as workers at $j = 21$, retire at 65 and can live to 100;
- Three family types:
  - Married parents ($\lambda = 0$),
  - Single childless men ($\lambda = 1$), and
  - Single mothers ($\lambda = 2$);
- Conditional transition probabilities of family type:

$\pi_{\lambda_{j+1}\|\lambda_j}$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 0$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 1$	$\lambda_{j+1} = 2$
$\lambda_j = 0$	$\psi_{j+1,m}\psi_{j+1,f}$	$\psi_{j+1,m}(1 - \psi_{j+1,f})$	$(1 - \psi_{j+1,m})\psi_{j+1,f}$
$\lambda_j = 1$	0	$\psi_{j+1,m}$	0
$\lambda_j = 2$	0	0	$\psi_{j+1,f}$

- Exogenous children determined by household's age j and education θ;
- Low education (θ_L) households have children earlier;
- Child spacing is identical for all parents.

◂ Model overview

Households: Preferences (1)

Every household at time t has preference represented by a time-separable expected utility function:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{J} \beta^{j-1} \left(\prod_{s=1}^{j-1} \pi_{\lambda_{s+1}|\lambda_s} \right) u(c_j, l_j^m, l_j^f, \lambda_j, \theta), \tag{1}$$

- β - discount factor;
- ψ - time-invariant survival probabilities;
- λ - household type (by marital and parental status)
- c - joint consumption;
- l^i - leisure time of $i \in m, f$;

◂ Households: Timeline

Households: Preferences (2)

The periodic household utility functions are:

$$u(c, l^m, l^f, \theta, \lambda = 0) = \frac{\left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{1,\theta}}\right)^{\nu} (l^m)^{1-\nu}\right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} + \left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{1,\theta}}\right)^{\nu} (l^f)^{1-\nu}\right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

$$u(c, l^m, \theta, \lambda = 1) = \frac{\left[(c)^{\nu} (l^m)^{1-\nu}\right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

$$u(c, l^f, \theta, \lambda = 2) = \frac{\left[\left(\frac{c}{\iota_{2,\theta}}\right)^{\nu} (l^f)^{1-\nu}\right]^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}}}{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}},$$

- Spouses are perfectly altruistic;
- $\iota_{\lambda,\theta} = \sqrt{\mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 1\}} + \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} + nc_{\theta}}$;
- γ - elasticity of intertemporal substitution;
- ν - taste for consumption.

◂ Households: Timeline

Households: Decision process (Overview)

Working-age married and single-mother households

$z_j := \{\lambda_j, a_j, h_j^f, \theta, \eta_j^m, \eta_j^f\} \in Z$ denotes a state vector.

A household aged j goes through the following decision making steps:

1. *Female participation,* $\ell_j \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, which determines
   - Exogenous work hours, $n^f_{\lambda,\ell,j}$,
   - Next-period human capital

$$log(h^f_{j+1}) = log(h^f_j) + (\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell} - \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell} \times j)\,\mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_j \neq 0\}} - \delta_h(1 - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_j \neq 0\}})$$

2. *ℓ-specific next-period assets $a_+(\ell_j, z_j)$ and consumption $c(\ell_j, z_j)$* by solving for optimal value $V(\ell_j, z_j)$;

3. *Optimal allocation at j:* $a^*_+ = a_+(\ell^*_j, z_j)$, $c^* = c(\ell^*_j, z_j)$ where

$$\ell^*_j \quad = \quad argmax\left\{MAX\left(V(0, z_j), V(1, z_j), V(2, z_j)\right)\right\}$$

◂ Households: Timeline

More on children...

5. Households have full information on children (e.g., arrival time, costs and benefits if work, etc);

6. No informal child care available;

7. Childcare quality and cost are identical;

8. Children leave home at 18 years old. This marks the end of the link between parents and their children;

9. No bequest motive.

◂ Back to Main Section

Bick (2016) finds that child care support does not increase the fertility rate in Germany. Discussed in Guner et al. (2020), evidence on child care quality is mixed. Marriage/divorce and education decisions are more likely impacted.

Households: Endowments

Labour income for $i \in \{m, f\}$ in working age $j = 1$ to $j = J_R = 45$:

$$y^i_{j,\lambda} = w n^i_{j,\lambda} e^i_{j,\lambda}$$

- w - wage rate;
- n - exogenous labour hours ($n = 1 - l$);
- e - earning ability:

Where

$$e^m_{j,\lambda} = \overline{e}_j \left(\theta, h^m_{j,\lambda}\right) \times \epsilon^m_j$$

- *Deterministic*: θ - permanent education; h - human capital;
- *Stochastic*: ϵ - transitory shocks.

Retirees receive means-tested pension $pen(y^m_{j,\lambda} + y^f_{j,\lambda},\ a_j)$.

Households (working age): Men

Men always works and receives labor income:

$$y_{j,\lambda}^{m} = wn_{j,\lambda}^{m}\theta h_{j,\lambda}^{m}\epsilon_{j}^{m}$$

n^m and h^m are exogenous.

The transitory shocks follow an *AR1* process:

$$\overbrace{\ln\left(\epsilon_{j}^{m}\right)}^{=\eta_{j}^{m}} = \rho^{m} \times \overbrace{\ln\left(\epsilon_{j-1}^{m}\right)}^{=\eta_{j-1}^{m}} + \upsilon_{j}^{m}; \qquad \upsilon_{j}^{m} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\upsilon}^{2}) \qquad (2)$$

Households: Trade-off for women

Costs of working

If a woman works, she incurs:

1. An ℓ-specific fixed time cost to leisure:

$$l_j^f = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \ell = 0 \\ 0 < 1 - n^f_{j,\lambda,\ell=1} - \chi_p < 1 & \text{if } \ell = 1 \\ 0 < 1 - n^f_{j,\lambda,\ell=2} - \chi_f < 1 & \text{if } \ell = 2 \end{cases}$$

2. Hourly childcare cost per child, κ_j; 3. A partial or total loss of the means-tested FTB transfers.

◂ Households: Decision process (Overview)

◂ Households: Timeline

Households: Trade-off for women

Benefits of working

However, if she works, she gains:

1. Labour income

$$y_j^f = wn_j^f \theta h_j^f \epsilon_j^f$$

$$\ln(\epsilon_j^f) = \rho \times \ln(\epsilon_{j-1}^f) + \upsilon_j^f; \qquad \upsilon_j \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$$

2. Enhanced human capital for the next period:

$$log(h_{j+1}^f) = log(h_j^f) + (\xi_{1,\lambda,\ell} - \xi_{2,\lambda,\ell} \times j)\,\mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_j \neq 0\}} - \delta_h(1 - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell_j \neq 0\}})$$

3. Child care subsidy, sr_j, per child

◂ Households: Decision process (Overview)

◂ Households: Timeline

Dynamic Optimization Problem: Working age

Married and single-mother households

$$V(z) = \max_{c,\, \ell,\, a_+} \Big\{ u(c, l^m, l^f, \theta, \lambda) + \beta \sum_{\Lambda} \int_{S^2} V(z_+)\, d\Pi(\lambda_+, \eta^m_+, \eta^f_+ \mid \lambda, \eta^m, \eta^f) \Big\} \tag{3}$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} (1+\tau^c)c + (a_+ - a) + \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell \neq 0\}} n^f_{\lambda,\ell} \times CE_\theta &= y_\lambda + (nc_\theta \times tr^A + tr^B) - T(y^m, y^f) \\ l^f &= 1 - n^f_{\lambda,\ell} - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell=1\}}\chi_p - \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell=2\}}\chi_f \\ l^m &= 1 - n^m_\lambda \quad \text{if} \quad \lambda = 0 \\ c &> 0 \\ a_+ &\geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

where:

- $y_\lambda = \mathbf{1}_{\{\lambda \neq 2\}} y^m + \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell \neq 0\}} y^f + ra$ is the total market income;
- $CE_\theta = w(1-sr)\sum_{i=1}^{nc_\theta} \kappa_i$ is the net child care cost per hour;
- $T(y^m, y^f)$ is sum of individual taxes based on (12) following Feldstein (1969), Benabou (2000), and Heathcote et al. (2017).

◂ Model overview

Dynamic Optimization Problem: Working age

Single male

$$V(z) = \max_{c,\, a_+} \left\{ u(c, l^m, \theta, \lambda = 1) + \beta \sum_{\Lambda} \int_{S^2} V(z_+)\, d\Pi(\lambda_+, \eta_+^m \mid \lambda, \eta^m) \right\} \quad (5)$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} (1+\tau^c)c + (a_+ - a) &= y^m - T(y^m) \quad (6) \\ l^m &= 1 - n^m_{\lambda=1} \\ c &> 0 \\ a_+ &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

where:

- $y^m = wn^m h^m_{\lambda=1}\theta\epsilon^m + ra$ is single male household's market income;
- $T(y^m)$ is single male's tax based on (12).

◂ Model overview

Dynamic Optimization Problem: **Retirement**

Retiree's state vector is $z^R = \{a, \lambda\}$

- No labour income, no children;
- Pension is dependent on household type and income.

$$V(z^R) = \max_{c,\, a_+} \left\{ u(c, \lambda) + \beta \sum_{\Lambda} V(z_+^R)\, d\Pi(\lambda_+|\lambda) \right\} \tag{7}$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} (1+\tau^c)c + (a_+ - a) &= ra + pen - T(y^m, y^f) \\ c &> 0 \\ a_+ \geq 0 \quad &and \quad a_{J+1} = 0 \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

◂ Model overview

Technology

- A firm with Cobb-Douglas production and labour-augmenting technology A (with constant growth rate g):

$$Y_t = K_t^{\alpha}(A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha}$$

- Firm maximizes profit according to:

$$\max_{K_t, L_t} \quad (1-\tau_t^k)(Y_t - w_t A_t L_t) - (r_t + \delta)K_t \tag{9}$$

- Firm's FOC yields:

$$r_t = (1-\tau_t^k)\alpha\frac{Y_t}{K_t} - \delta \tag{10}$$

$$w_t = (1-\alpha)\frac{Y_t}{A_t L_t} \tag{11}$$

◂ Back to Household's Problem

Government: Tax system

Separate tax filing for $i \in \{m, f\}$ on $\widetilde{y}_j$

$$tax_j^i = \max\left\{0, \quad \widetilde{y}_j - \zeta \widetilde{y}_j^{1-\tau}\right\} \tag{12}$$

Where

- $\widetilde{y}_j = y_{j,\lambda}^i + \mathbf{1}_{\lambda=0}\frac{ra_j}{2} + \mathbf{1}_{\lambda\neq 0} ra_j$ is the taxable income
- ζ is a scaling parameter
- τ controls progressivity of the tax scheme:
  - $\tau \to \infty \implies$ tax everything;
  - $\tau = 0 \implies (1-\zeta)$ is a flat tax rate.

◂ Back to Household's Problem

Government: Family Tax Benefit part A (1)

The FTB part A is paid per dependent child.

There are 3 pairs of key parameters:

1. **Max** *and* **base** *payments per child*: $\{tr_j^{A1};\ tr_j^{A2}\}$;
2. **Income thresholds** *for max and base payments*: $\{\bar{y}_{max}^{tr};\ \bar{y}_{base}^{tr}\}$;
3. **Taper rates** *for max and base payments*: $\{\omega_{A1};\ \omega_{A2}\}$

Government: Family Tax Benefit part A (2)

The FTB-A payment per child is:

$$tr_j^A = \begin{cases} tr_j^{A1} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_{max}^{tr} \\ \max\left\{tr_j^{A2}, \quad tr_j^{A1} - \omega_{A1}\left(y_{j,\lambda} - \bar{y}_{max}^{tr}\right)\right\} & \text{if } \bar{y}_{max}^{tr} < y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}_{base}^{tr} \\ \max\left\{0, \quad tr_j^{A2} - \omega_{A2}\left(y_{j,\lambda} - \bar{y}_{base}^{tr}\right)\right\} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \geq \bar{y}_{base}^{tr}, \end{cases} \tag{13}$$

Where

- $y_{j,\lambda}$ is the joint income of a household type λ aged j.

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

Government: Family Tax Benefit part B (1)

The FTB part B is paid per household to provide additional support to single parents and single-earner parents with limited means.

There are 3 pairs of key parameters:

1. **Two max payments** *for households with children aged* $[0, 4]$ *or* $[5, 18]$: $\{tr_j^{\text{B1}};\ tr_j^{\text{B2}}\}$;
2. **Separate income thresholds** *for* y_{pe} *and* y_{se}: $\{\bar{y}_{pe}^{tr};\ \bar{y}_{se}^{tr}\}$;
3. *A* **taper rate** *based on* y_{se}: ω_B

See FTB part B formula.

Government: Family Tax Benefit part B (2)

If $y_{pe} \leq \bar{y}_{pe}^{tr}$, the FTB-B payment per household is:

$$tr_j^B = \begin{cases} \Upsilon_1 \times tr_j^{B1} + \Upsilon_2 \times tr_j^{B2} & \text{if } y_{se} \leq \bar{y}_{se}^{tr} \\ \Upsilon_1 \times \max\left\{0,\ tr_j^{B1} - \omega_B(y_{se} - \bar{y}_{se}^{tr})\right\} & \text{if } y_{se} > \bar{y}_{se}^{tr} \\ +\Upsilon_2 \times \max\left\{0,\ tr_j^{B2} - \omega_B(y_{se} - \bar{y}_{se}^{tr})\right\} & \end{cases} \tag{14}$$

Where

- $\Upsilon_1 = \mathbf{1}_{\{nc_{[0,4],j} \geq 1\}}$
- $\Upsilon_2 = \mathbf{1}_{\{nc_{[0,4],j}=0 \text{ and } (nc_{[5,15],j} \geq 1 \ \ or \ \ nc_{[16,18]_{AS},j} \geq 1)\}}$
- $y_{pe} = \max(y_{j,\lambda}^m,\ y_{j,\lambda}^f)$ is the primary earner's income
- $y_{se} = \min(y_{j,\lambda}^m,\ y_{j,\lambda}^f)$ is the secondary earner's income

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

Government: Child Care Subsidy (1)

The Child Care Subsidy (CCS) assists households with the cost of formal care for **children aged 13 or younger**. The rate of subsidy

depends on

1. **Statutory rates**: $sr = \{0.85, 0.5, 0.2, 0\}$;
2. **Income thresholds**: $\bar{y}_i^{sr}$ *for* $i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$;
3. **Hour thresholds** *of recognized activities*;
4. *A* **taper rate**, ω_C^i, *on household income* y_{hh}

See CCS formula.

Government: Child Care Subsidy (2)

The formal child care subsidy rate is:

$$sr = \Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n^{min}_{j,\lambda}) \times \begin{cases} sr_1 & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}^{sr}_1 \\ max\{sr_2,\ sr_1 - \omega^1_c\} & \text{if } \bar{y}^{sr}_1 < y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}^{sr}_2 \\ sr_2 & \text{if } \bar{y}^{sr}_2 \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}^{sr}_3 \\ max\{sr_3,\ sr_2 - \omega^3_c\} & \text{if } \bar{y}^{sr}_3 \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}^{sr}_4 \\ sr_3 & \text{if } \bar{y}^{sr}_4 \leq y_{j,\lambda} < \bar{y}^{sr}_5 \\ sr_4 & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \geq \bar{y}^{sr}_5 \end{cases} \tag{15}$$

Where

- ω^i_C is the taper rate
- $\Psi(y_{j,\lambda}, n^{min}_{j,\lambda})$ is the adjustment factor, and
- $n^{min}_j = min\{n^m_{j,\lambda}, n^f_{j,\lambda,\ell}\}$

◂ List of calibrated parameters
◂ Model vs Data moments

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

Goverment: Old Age Pension (1)

Pension is funded by the general government budget.

Pension is available to households aged $j \geq J_R$ and is means-tested (*income and assets tests*).

Income test:

$$\mathcal{P}^y\left(y_{j,\lambda}\right) = \begin{cases} p^{\max} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} \leq \bar{y}_1^p \\ \max\left\{0,\ p^{\max} - \omega_y\left(y_j^p - \bar{y}_1^p\right)\right\} & \text{if } y_{j,\lambda} > \bar{y}_1^p, \end{cases} \tag{16}$$

Asset test:

$$\mathcal{P}^a\left(a_j\right) = \begin{cases} p^{\max} & \text{if } a_j \leq \bar{a}_1 \\ \max\left\{0,\ p^{\max} - \omega_a\left(a_j - \bar{a}_1\right)\right\} & \text{if } a_j > \bar{a}_1, \end{cases} \tag{17}$$

Government: Old Age Pension (2)

The amount of pension benefit claimable, pen_j, is the minimum of (16) and (17). That is,

$$pen_j = \begin{cases} \min\left\{\mathcal{P}^a\left(a_j\right), \mathcal{P}^y\left(y_{j,\lambda}\right)\right\} & \text{if } j \geq J_P \text{ and } \lambda = 0 \\ \frac{2}{3}\min\left\{\mathcal{P}^a\left(a_j\right), \mathcal{P}^y\left(y_{j,\lambda}\right)\right\} & \text{if } j \geq J_P \text{ and } \lambda = 1, 2 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{18}$$

Government: Budget

Government at time t collects taxes (T_t^c, T_t^K, T_t^I) and issue bond $(B_{t+1} - B_t)$ to meet its debt obligation $(r_t B_t)$ and its commitment to three spending programs:

- General government purchase, G_t;
- Family transfers (FTB + CCS), Tr_t;
- Old age pension, P_t.

The fiscal budget balance equation is therefore

$$(B_{t+1} - B_t) + T_t^C + T_t^K + T_t^I = G_t + Tr_t + \mathcal{P}_t + r_t B_t. \quad (19)$$

Competitive Equilibrium: **Measure of Households**

Let $\phi_t(z)$ and $\Phi_t(z)$ denote the population growth- and mortality-unadjusted population density and cumulative distributions, respectively, and Ω_t denotes the vector of parameters at time t.

Initial distribution of newborns:

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} d\Phi_t(\lambda,a,h,\theta,\eta_m,\eta_f) &= \int_{\Lambda\times\Theta\times S^2} d\Phi_t(\lambda,0,0,\theta,\eta_m,\eta_f)=1, \quad \text{and}\\ \phi_t(\lambda,0,0,\theta,\eta_m,\eta_f) &= \pi(\lambda)\times\pi(\theta)\times\pi(\eta_m)\times\pi(\eta_f).\end{aligned}$$

The population density $\phi_t(z)$ evolves according to:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi_{t+1}(z^+) = \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} &\mathbf{1}_{\{a^+=a^+(z,\Omega_t),\, h^+=h^+(z,\Omega_t)\}}\times\pi(\lambda^+|\lambda)\\ &\times\pi(\eta_m^+|\eta_m)\times\pi(\eta_f^+|\eta_f)\, d\Phi_t(z) \qquad (20)\end{aligned}$$

Competitive Equilibrium: **Aggregation (Households)**

Given the optimal decisions $\{c(z,\Omega_t),\ \ell(z,\Omega_t),\ a(z,\Omega_t)\}_{j=1}^{J}$, the share of alive households $(\mu_{j,t})$ and the distribution of households $\phi_t(z)$ at time t, we arrive at:

$$C_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} c(z,\Omega_t)\mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z) \tag{21}$$

$$A_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} a(z,\Omega_t)\mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z) \tag{22}$$

$$LFP_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell(z,\Omega_t)\neq 0\}}\mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z). \tag{23}$$

$$LM_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} h^m_{j,\lambda} e^{\theta+\eta_m}\mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z) \tag{24}$$

$$LF_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} \mathbf{1}_{\{\ell(z,\Omega_t)\neq 0\}} h^f_{j,\lambda,\ell} e^{\theta+\eta_f}\mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z). \tag{25}$$

Competitive Equilibrium: **Aggregation (Government)**

Given the optimal decisions $\{c(z,\Omega_t),\ \ell(z,\Omega_t),\ a(z,\Omega_t)\}_{j=1}^{J}$, government policy parameters, the share of alive households $(\mu_{j,t})$ and the distribution of households $\phi_t(z)$ at time t, we arrive at:

$$T_t^C = \tau_t^c C_t \tag{26}$$

$$T_t^K = \tau_t^k (Y_t - w_t A_t L_t) \tag{27}$$

$$T_t^I = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} tax_j \mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z). \tag{28}$$

$$Tr_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} (ftba_j + ftbb_j + ccs_j)\ \mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z) \tag{29}$$

$$\mathcal{P}_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda\times A\times H\times\Theta\times S^2} pen_j \mu_{j,t}\, d\Phi_t(z). \tag{30}$$

Competitive Equilibrium: Definition (1)

Given the household, firm and government policy parameters, the demographic structure, the world interest rate, a steady state equilibrium is such that:

1. The collection of individual household decisions $\{c_j, \ell_j, a_{j+1}\}_{j=1}^{J}$ solve the household problem (**??**) and (**??**);
2. The firm chooses labor and capital inputs to solve the profit maximization problem (10);
3. The government budget constraint (19) is satisfied;
4. The markets for capital and labour clear:

$$K_t = A_t + B_t + B_{F,t} \tag{31}$$

$$L_t = LM_t + LF_t \tag{32}$$

Competitive Equilibrium: Definition (2)

5. Goods market clears:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= C_t + I_t + G_t + NX_t \\ NX_t &= (1+n)(1+g)B_{F,t+1} - (1+r)B_{F,t} \\ B_{F,t} &= A_t - K_t - B_t \end{aligned} \tag{33}$$

Where

- $I_t = (1+n)(1+g)K_{t+1} - (1-\delta)K_t$ is investment
- NX_t is the trade balance, and
- $B_{F,t}$ is the foreign capital required to clear the capital market.

Competitive Equilibrium: Definition (3)

6. The total lump-sum bequest transfer, BQ_t, is the total assets left by all deceased households at time t:

$$BQ_t = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \int_{\Lambda \times A \times H \times \Theta \times S^2} (1 - \psi_{j,\lambda})(1 + r_t) a(z, \Omega_t) \, d\Phi_t(z). \tag{34}$$

Bequest to each surviving household aged j at time t is

$$beq_{j,t} = \left[\frac{b_{j,t}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} b_{j,t} \, m_{j,t}} \right] BQ_t \tag{35}$$

Assuming bequest is uniform among alive working-age agents, then $b_{j,t} = \frac{1}{JR-1}$ if $j < JR$ and $b_{j,t} = 0$ otherwise. Thus,

$$beq_{j,t} = \frac{BQ_t}{\sum_{j=1}^{JR-1} m_{j,t}} \tag{36}$$

Summary: Externally Calibrated Parameters (1)

Parameter	Value	Target (2012-2018)
Demographics		
Lifespan	$J = 80$	Age 21-100
Retirement	$J_R = 45$	Age Pension age 65
Population growth	$n = 1.6\%$	Average (ABS)
Survival probabilities	ψ_m, ψ_f	Australian Life Tables (ABS)
Measure of newborns by type	$\{\pi(\lambda_0), \pi(\lambda_1), \pi(\lambda_2)\} = \{0.70, 0.14, 0.16\}$	HILDA 2010-2018
Technology		
Labour augmenting tech. growth	$g = 1.3\%$	Average per hour worked growth rate (World Bank)
Output share of capital	$\alpha = 0.4$	Output share of capital for Australia
Real interest rate	$r = 4\%$	Average (World Bank)
Households		
Relative risk aversion	$\sigma = \frac{1}{\gamma} = 3$	standard values 2.5-3.5
Work hours	$n_{m,\lambda}$, $n_{f,\lambda}$	Age-profiles of avg. hours for employees (HILDA)
Male human capital profile	h^m_λ	Age-profile of hourly wages for married men

◂ Internally calibrated parameters

Summary: Externally Calibrated Parameters (2)

Parameter	Value	Target
Permanent shocks		
Value	$\{\theta_L, \theta_H\} = \{0.745, 1.342\}$	College-HS wage ratio of 1.8 (HILDA, 2012-2018)
Measure of $\{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$ type households	$\{\pi(\theta_L), \pi(\theta_H)\} = \{0.7, 0.3\}$	College-HS ratio (ABS, 2018)
Fiscal Policy		
Income tax progressivity	$\tau = 0.2$	Tran and Zakariyya (2021)
Consumption tax	$\tau_c = 8\%$	$\tau_c \frac{C_0}{Y_0} = 4.5\%$; $\frac{C_0}{Y_0} = 56.3\%$
Company profit tax	$\tau^k = 10.625\%$	$\tau^k \left(\frac{Y - WL}{Y}\right) = 4.5\%$; $\frac{WL}{Y} = 1 - \alpha$
Gov't debt-to-GDP	$\frac{B}{Y} = 20\%$	Average (CEIC data, 2012-2018)
Gov't general purchase	$\frac{G}{Y} = 14\%$	Net of FTB, CCS and Age Pension (WDI and AIHW)
FTB, CCS and pension parameters		HILDA Tax-Benefit model

◂ Internally calibrated parameters

Calibration: Demographics (1)

1. Since child-related transfers are concentrated during child-bearing and raising age, we set one model period to correspond to 1 year of life to better capture behavioural responses;

2. Time-invariant n, ψ_m and ψ_m induce an unchanging population structure in every period t (see share of survivors).

Calibration: Demographics (2)



Figure: Share of survivors over life cycle

Calibration: Endowment (Deterministic) (1)



Figure: Age profiles of average labor hours

Calibration: Endowment (Deterministic, Female)

We calibrate the female human capital accumulation rate that their human capital profiles match those of their male counterparts:

- if the wife works without time off over life cycle, and
- assuming ex-ante assortative matching of couples in terms of skills.

Our estimates are:

- Married mothers working full time:
  $(\xi_{1,\lambda=0,\ell=1}, \xi_{2,\lambda=0,\ell=1}) = (0.0450, -0.00175)$
- Married mothers working part time:
  $(\xi_{1,\lambda=0,\ell=2}, \xi_{2,\lambda=0,\ell=2}) = (0.0350, -0.00135)$
- Single mothers working full time:
  $(\xi_{1,\lambda=2,\ell=1}, \xi_{2,\lambda=2,\ell=1}) = (0.0206, -0.00088)$
- Single mothers working part time:
  $(\xi_{1,\lambda=2,\ell=2}, \xi_{2,\lambda=2,\ell=2}) = (0.0179, -0.00060)$

Calibration: Endowment (Deterministic, Children)

Children:

1. Assign *first and second child births* to
   - type θ_H households aged $\{28, 31\}$;
   - type θ_L households aged $\{21, 24\}$ (See LSAC and AIHW reports)
2. Child care service fee is \$12.5/*hour* or 48% of age 21 married male hourly wage.
3. Assume for child care service and school fees, parents pay
   - 100% of the fee for pre-school age children (0-5);
   - 1/3 of the fee for school age children;

Calibration: Endowment (Stochastic income process)

We calibrate the AR1 stochastic process, η^i, for $i \in \{m, f\}$ as follows:

- Discretized into 5 grid points:

$$\eta^i = \{0.29813, 0.54601, 1, 1.83146, 3.35424\}$$

- Transition probabilities obtained via Rouwenhorst method:

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0.9606 & 0.0388 & 0.0006 & 0 & 0 \\ 0.0097 & 0.9609 & 0.0291 & 0.0003 & 0 \\ 0.0001 & 0.0194 & 0.9610 & 0.0194 & 0.0001 \\ 0 & 0.0003 & 0.0291 & 0.9609 & 0.0097 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.0006 & 0.0388 & 0.9606 \end{bmatrix}$$

Calibration: Endowment (Stochastic income process)

- Persistence: $\rho = 0.98$;
- Variance of the innovation to shocks: $\sigma_\epsilon^2 = 0.0145$ to achieve a Gini coefficient of age 21 male wage distribution of 0.35;
- The set-up results in GINI $= 0.3766$ for wage distribution of work-age male population (not targeted).

Lorenz Curve (male wages at aged 21 and 22)



Figure: Lorenz curves of the distributions of married male wages at age 21 and 22

Overview of counterfactual policy experiments

With *income tax as a budget-balancing tool*,

1. Are child-related transfers socially desirable?
   - Experiment 1: Abolish FTB;
   - Experiment 2: Abolish CCS;
   - Experiment 3: Abolish FTB and CCS;
2. Should child-related transfers be means-tested or universal?
   - Experiment 4: Universalize FTB and CCS;
3. **Extensions:**

   a). Experiment 5-6: Does adjusting the size of universal transfer address the inequity issue?

   b). Experiment 7-14: Is there a simple and well-rounded incremental reform?

Are child-related transfers desirable?
Heterogeneous consumption and welfare responses

C (%)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Age 21-30	+8.12	+15.74	−0.11	−0.07	−7.74	−11.55
Age 31-40	+14.59	+14.83	−0.06	−0.06	−3.04	−6.88
Age 41-50	+9.65	+6.71	−0.03	−0.01	−4.20	−9.39
Age 51-60	+6.80	+6.59	+0.03	+0.07	−3.22	−8.03
Age 61-70	+6.24	+5.69	+1.12	+1.44	−1.32	−6.00
Age 71-80	+6.61	+4.10	+6.10	+6.36	+1.66	−3.09
Age 81-90	+5.48	+1.80	+9.83	+9.11	+2.13	−3.06
Welfare (%)	+1.35	−0.22	+0.02	+0.06	−4.03	−6.53

Table: **Heterogeneous consumption and welfare effects of abolishing the FTB and the CCS** (*M*: Married, *SM*: Single men, *SW*: Single women (Single mothers); *H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

◂ Main Section: Are child-related transfers desirable

Are child-related transfers desirable?
CVs of output and consumption



Figure: **Coefficients of variation of log output and log consumption: Benchmark (black) vs FTB and CCS elimination reform (red).**

◂ Main Section: Are child-related transfers desirable

Means-testing or Universal?
Heterogeneous labour supply responses

Labor supply responses by mothers to universalized child-related transfers										
LFP (*pp*)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70	*FT* (*pp*)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
M (H)	+0.039	+0.335	+0.132	+0.013	−0.016	M (H)	+0.478	+1.079	−0.029	−0.088	−0.081
M (L)	+0.923	+0.784	+0.390	+0.054	−0.015	M (L)	+2.356	+0.497	+0.322	+0.018	−0.086
S (H)	0	0	0	0	0	S (H)	−0.031	−0.019	−0.004	−0.009	0
S (L)	0	0	0	−0.001	+0.001	S (L)	+0.013	−0.028	−0.002	−0.004	+0.003

	Hour (%)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61-70
	M (H)	+6.33	+21.87	+1.69	−1.25	−6.12
	M (L)	+28.49	+9.42	+4.64	+0.60	−3.11
	S (H)	−1.26	−1.40	−0.32	−0.89	−0.12
	S (L)	+0.24	−0.88	−0.06	−0.20	+0.48

Table: **Heterogeneous labor supply responses by married (M) and single (S) female households to universal child-related transfers** (*H*: high education, and *L*: low education)**.**

◂ Main Section: Means-testing or Universal?

Means-testing or Universal
Heterogeneous consumption and welfare outcomes

C (%)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Age 21-30	+4.56	+12.70	−4.12	−3.65	−3.64	−1.12
Age 31-40	+8.59	+6.18	−4.11	−3.90	−1.69	−2.65
Age 41-50	+3.82	+2.40	−4.08	−3.97	−0.96	−2.25
Age 51-60	+2.92	+2.30	−4.03	−3.97	−1.05	−2.30
Age 61-70	+3.02	+2.56	−3.35	−3.13	+0.15	−0.93
Age 71-80	+3.81	+2.54	−0.31	−0.44	+2.34	+1.03
Age 81-90	+3.53	+2.12	+1.96	+1.21	+3.08	+1.70
Welfare (%)	+1.36	+1.34	−1.47	−1.20	−0.69	−0.51

Table: **Heterogeneous household consumption and welfare responses to universal child-related transfers** (*M*: Married, *SM*: Single men, *SW*: Single women (Single mothers); *H*: High education and *L*: Low education).

◂ Main Section: Means-testing or Universal

Universal programs varied by size: Heterogeneous labor supply responses

Labor supply responses by mothers								
	0.5×Benchmark rates				1.5×Benchmark rates			
LFP (*pp*)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60
M (H)	−0.0935	+0.0634	+0.0397	−0.0149	+0.0379	+0.3452	+0.1266	+0.0019
M (L)	+0.1662	+0.5453	+0.3592	+0.0440	+2.1401	+0.9600	+0.3522	+0.0051
S (H)	0	0	0	−0.0004	0	0	0	−0.0004
S (L)	0	0	−0.0002	−0.0018	0	0	−0.0001	−0.0002
HOURS (*pp*)	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60
M (H)	+1.60	+1.88	−0.29	−1.51	+7.47	+26.81	+0.33	−3.12
M (L)	−1.31	+4.78	+3.44	+0.48	+52.70	+11.41	+5.05	+0.14
S (H)	+0.14	+2.66	−0.30	−0.79	−1.31	−2.20	−0.34	−0.91
S (L)	+0.55	+2.27	−0.06	−0.25	−0.58	−4.86	−0.07	−0.22

Table: **Heterogeneous labor supply responses by married (M) and single (S) female households to universal child-related transfers varied by transfer size** (*H*: high education, and *L*: low education)**.**

◂ Main Section: Universal programs varied by size

Incremental reforms to payment rates

	Aggregate implications of incremental reforms			
	FTB payment rates		CCS subsidy rates	
	$0.5 \times tr$	$1.5 \times tr$	$0.5 \times sr$	$1.5 \times sr$
Tax rate, *pp*	−0.36	+0.19	−1.37	+0.69
Fe. LFP, *pp*	−5.65	+1.00	+1.13	−2.87
Fe. Hour, %	−10.89	+3.67	+3.28	−5.05
Fe. Human Cap, %	−4.95	+0.93	+0.92	−2.22
Cons. (C), %	−2.41	+1.03	−0.17	−1.09
Output (Y), %	−1.52	+2.20	+0.88	−1.08
Welfare (EV), %	−0.41	−0.02	−0.82	+0.28

Table: **Aggregate efficiency and welfare effects of incremental reforms payment/subsidy rates**

◂ Main Section: Incremental reforms to taper rates

Incremental reforms: Heterogeneous consumption and welfare outcomes

C (%)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
Age 21-30	+1.59	+1.89	+0.98	+0.76	+0.95	+1.06
Age 31-40	+1.72	+1.25	+0.99	+0.86	+1.15	+0.77
Age 41-50	+1.48	+1.12	+1.01	+0.92	+1.02	+0.54
Age 51-60	+1.30	+1.13	+1.02	+0.96	+1.05	+0.60
Age 61-70	+1.22	+1.07	+1.05	+1.00	+1.17	+0.76
Age 71-80	+1.20	+0.99	+1.16	+1.03	+1.16	+0.87
Age 81-90	+1.15	+0.93	+1.19	+1.01	+1.13	+0.88
Welfare (%)	+0.42	+0.40	+0.34	+0.24	+0.26	+0.18

Table: **Heterogeneous household consumption and welfare responses to halving the CCS taper rates** (*M*: Married, *SM*: Single men, *SW*: Single women (Single mothers); *H*: High education and *L*: Low education)**.**

◂ Main Section: Incremental reforms to taper rates

Findings: Means-testing or Universal? (2)

Consumption and welfare changes by household type												
C (%)	0.5×Baseline payment rates						1.5×Baseline payment rates					
	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)	M (H)	M (L)	SM (H)	SM (L)	SW (H)	SW (L)
21-30	+3.6	−0.7	−0.1	−0.1	+0.4	+0.8	+5.1	+21.4	−6.2	−5.6	−5.2	−3.8
31-40	+5.0	+3.5	−0.1	−0.1	+3.0	+1.5	+9.9	+9.2	−6.1	−5.9	−3.9	−5.0
41-50	+3.9	+3.5	−0.1	−0.1	+2.9	+1.2	+4.0	+3.3	−6.1	−5.9	−3.0	−4.0
51-60	+3.5	+3.7	−0.1	−0.1	+2.8	+1.2	+3.0	+3.1	−6.0	−5.9	−3.0	−4.1
61-70	+3.8	+4.1	+0.3	+0.3	+3.4	+1.8	+3.1	+3.3	−5.1	−4.7	−1.5	−2.1
71-80	+4.6	+3.8	+2.3	+2.0	+4.2	+2.8	+4.0	+3.3	−1.3	−0.9	+1.7	+0.9
81-90	+4.3	+3.1	+3.7	+2.8	+4.4	+2.9	+3.6	+2.7	+1.5	+1.4	+2.8	+2.0
Welfare (%)	+1.4	−0.02	−0.04	−0.02	+0.4	+0.1	+1.6	+2.6	−2.2	−1.9	−1.3	−0.9

Table 5: Heterogeneous consumption and welfare changes from varying the universal system's payment rates.

◂ Overall efficiency and welfare changes
◂ Heterogeneous labour responses

Average taxes over time



Figure: **Estimates of average taxes by quantiles over time using the parametric tax function.**

Welfare expenditure in Australia

Financial year	Welfare ($b)	Welfare-GDP (%)	Welfare-Revenue (%)
2010-11	140.19	8.43	34.04
2011-12	149.66	8.7	34.2
2012-13	153.24	8.89	33.62
2013-14	155.68	8.88	33.47
2014-15	165.13	9.41	35.15
2015-16	167.68	9.47	34.59
2016-17	165.76	8.95	33.02
2017-18	171.62	8.99	32
2018-19	174.24	8.8	31.18
2019-20	195.71	9.86	36.05

Note: $ value is expressed in 2019-20 prices.

Source: *Australian Institute of Health and Welfare*

Welfare expenditure to GDP (%) by target groups

Financial year	Families & children	Old people	Disabled	Unemployed	Others
2009-10	2.51	3.33	1.87	0.48	0.40
2010-11	2.39	3.33	1.94	0.44	0.34
2011-12	2.33	3.43	1.98	0.44	0.52
2012-13	2.31	3.57	2.00	0.49	0.52
2013-14	2.26	3.47	2.02	0.55	0.57
2014-15	2.33	3.79	2.09	0.59	0.61
2015-16	2.32	3.86	2.08	0.60	0.62
2016-17	2.02	3.72	2.01	0.57	0.63
2017-18	1.94	3.67	2.18	0.56	0.65
2018-19	1.81	3.63	2.22	0.49	0.64
2019-20	1.92	3.85	2.53	0.93	0.62

Source: *Australian Institute of Health and Welfare*

◂ Back to Introduction

Proportion of children in child care by child age and FTB receipt



Figure: **Proportion of children in child care by child age and FTB receipt**

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

Extensive and Intensive Margins of Child Care Subsidy



Figure: **Left: Proportion of hours paid for that are unsubsidized. Right: Child Care Subsidy rates and Mean Benefits.**

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

FTB-A: Base payment rates



Figure: **Base FTB-A payment rates per qualified child.**

FTB-A: Maximum payment rates



Figure: **Maximum FTB-A payment rates per qualified child.**

Fraction of FTB recipients by income and wealth deciles



Fraction of FTB recipients by income and wealth deciles

◂ Child-related transfers in Australia

FTB-A: Extensive margin



Figure: **Fractions of FTB-A recipients over time.**

FTB-A: Intensive margin



Figure: **Average FTB-A payment per family (2018 AUD) over time.**

FTB-A: Average payment per family by marital status



Figure: **Average FTB-A payment per family by marital status over time**

FTB-A: Income test thresholds



Figure: **FTB-A income test thresholds for maximum and base payment rates.**

FTB-A: Taper rates



Figure: **FTB-A taper/phase-out rates for maximum and base payments.**

FTB-B: Payment rates



Figure: **FTB-B payment rates per family by age of the youngest child in the family.**

FTB-B: Extensive margins



Figure: **Fractions of FTB-B recipients by marital status.**

FTB-B: Intensive margin



Figure: **Average FTB-B payment per family by marital status.**

FTB-B: Income test thresholds



Figure: **FTB-B thresholds over time on primary and secondary earners over time.**

FTB-B: Taper rates



Figure: **FTB-B taper rates (on secondary earners' earnings) over time.**

FTB-B: Fractions of recipients and average payment over time



Figure: **Fractions of FTB-B recipients and average FTB-B payment per family (2018 AUD) over time.**

Fact 2: Labor force participation









Fact 2: Work hours



Solid line: Married male parents; Dashed line: Married male non-parents



Solid line: Married female parents; Dashed line: Married female non-parents



Solid line: Single male parents; Dashed line: Single male non-parents



Solid line: Single female parents; Dashed line: Single female non-parents

Example FTB schedule



◂ FTB formula

Example CCS schedule: Income test



◂ CCS formula

Example CCS schedule: Work hour test



◂ CCS formula

Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) Schedule

Young mother with: two children, low education, husband earning $60,000



◂ Life-cycle EMTR: Stay-at-home ◂ Life-cycle EMTR: Part-time

Computing the Steady State: Algorithm (1)

We solve the benchmark model (*small open economy*) for its initial balanced-growth path steady state equilibrium.

1. Parameterize the model and discretize assets on $[a_{min}, a_{max}]$ such that:
   - Number of grid points, $N_A = 70$;
   - $a_{min} = 0$ (No-borrowing constraint);
   - The grid if fairly dense near a_{min} so households are not restricted by an all-or-nothing decision;
   - a_{max} is sufficiently large so that (i) *households are not bound by* a_{max}, and (ii) *there is enough room for upward movement induced by new policy regimes*.

   and for human capital grids on $[h^f_{min}, h^f_{max}]$:
   - Number of grid points, $N_H = 25$;
   - $h^f_{min} = h^m_{j=21} = 1$;
   - $h^f_{max} = h^m_{j=50} = 1.546$;

Computing the Steady State: Algorithm (2)

2. Guess K_0 and L_0, endogenous government policy variables, and w_m, taking $r = r^w$ as given;

3. Solve the firm's problem for $(w_m,\ w_f)$;

4. Given the factor prices (w_m, w_f, r) and the initial steady state vector of parameters (Ω_0), solve the household problem for decision rules on $\{a^+, c, l^f\}$ by backward induction (from $j = J$ to $j = 1$) using *value function iteration*;

$w_m = w_f = w$ in this basic version of our model.

Computing the Steady State: Algorithm (3)

5. Starting from a known distribution of newborns, compute the measure of households across states by forward induction, using
   - the computed decision rules,
   - ψ,
   - η and its Markov transition probabilities, and
   - the law of motion of female human capital (**??**).

6. Accounting for the share of alive agents, sum across states for aggregate variables: A, C, L, T and Tr. Update L, K, I and Y (convex update). Solve for endogenous government policy variables.

Computing the Steady State: Algorithm (4)

7. Given the updated variables, compute the goods market convergence criterion for a small open economy:

$$Y = C + I + G + NX$$

   - $B_F = A - K - B$;
   - $NX = (1 + r)B_{F,t} - (1 + n)(1 + g)B_{F,t+1}$;
   - $NX < 0$ implies a capital account surplus (increase in foreign indebtedness).

8. Return to step 3 until the convergence criterion is satisfied.

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