

Lifecycle Earnings Risk and Insurance: New Evidence from Australia

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Our study

1. Better understand the nature of income shock process in Australia
 - Decompose sources of earnings changes: Wage or hour
 - Explore individual earnings risk by age and income history
2. Study the insurance role of family and government
 - Family: Market earnings and private transfers
 - Government: Progressive taxes and targeted public transfers

Data and methodology

Data: HILDA 2001-2020 (152,903 observations).

Sampling criteria: (i) Primary earner, (ii) Employment history.

Methodology: Non-parametric approach following [Guvenen et al. \(2021\)](#) and [De Nardi et al. \(2021\)](#).

Definition: Risks

Residual income shocks := changes or growth of residual income (net of age and time effects) over time.

- ▶ **Second-order income risk:** Variance of a residual income shock distribution
- ▶ **Third-order income risk:** Skewness (S) measures the lack of symmetry in data distribution of shocks. A normal distribution has $S=0$
 - ▶ S between -0.5 and 0.5 : fairly symmetrical;
 - ▶ S between -1 and -0.5 or between 0.5 and 1 : moderately skewed.
 - ▶ S less than -1 or greater than 1 : highly skewed.
- ▶ **Forth-order income risk:** Kurtosis (K) measures the tails of a shock distribution. It is actually the measure of outliers present in data.
 - ▶ $K = 3$ (Mesokurtic): Standard normal distribution
 - ▶ $K > 3$ (Leptokurtic): Distribution is longer, tails are fatter
 - ▶ $K < 3$ (Platykurtic): Distribution is shorter, tails are thinner

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
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
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Empirical distribution of annual residual earnings shocks




Example: Insurance against 2nd-order earnings risk

Primary earner's market income




Example: Insurance against 2nd-order earnings risk

Primary earner's market income + Secondary earners' market income




Example: Insurance against 2nd-order earnings risk

Primary earner's market income + Secondary earners' market income + Private transfers




Example: Insurance against 2nd-order earnings risk

Primary earner's market income + Secondary earners' market income + Private transfers – (Combined taxes - Concessions)



Example: Insurance against 2nd-order earnings risk

Primary earner's market income + Secondary earners' market income +
Private transfers - (Combined taxes - Concessions) + Public transfers



Related literature

Non-gaussian properties of earnings dynamics:

- ▶ Guvenen et al. (2021): US;
- ▶ Halvorsen et al. (2020): Norway;
- ▶ De Nardi et al. (2021): US and the Netherlands.

Studies in Australia:

- ▶ Gaussian shocks:
 - ▶ Chatterjee et al. (2016); Freestone (2018): Wage inequality and unobserved shocks;
 - ▶ Kaplan et al. (2018): Consumption and income inequality;
- ▶ Level and first moment of income:
 - ▶ Herauld and Azpitarte (2015): Redistributive impact of tax and transfer;
 - ▶ Tran and Zakariyya (2021): Trends in tax progressivity and redistribution.

Main results

Main results for Australia are:

1. Non-linear and non-Gaussian income dynamics;
2. Shock distributions are highly left skewed and leptokurtic;
3. Substantial government and family insurance against risks;
4. These features of income dynamics are persistent.

Cross-country comparison

| | Australia | The Netherlands | US |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u><i>Driver of earnings risk</i></u> | | | |
| Dispersion | Wages | Wages & Hours* | Wages & Hours |
| Left Skewness | Hours | Hours | Hours |
| Excess Kurtosis | Hours | Hours | Hours |
| <u><i>Main insurance</i></u> | | | |
| Dispersion | Gov't | Gov't | Family & Gov't |
| Left Skewness | Family | Family & Gov't | Family |
| Excess Kurtosis | Family | Family & Gov't | Family |

*Note: In the Netherlands, hour changes contribute more to earnings dispersion at the lower income deciles

New findings and key lessons

What's new?

1. Income risks are more persistent for certain groups;
2. Risk equalizing effect of government insurance;
3. Within-country evidence of crowding-out effect of government insurance;

Key lessons and recommendations:

1. Institutional structure may explain the cross-country differences;
2. Risk gap and welfare effect of redistribution;
3. Persistent risks suggest the importance of government insurance, but *what explains the persistence of risks?*
4. Government insurance may crowd out family insurance;
5. More realistic shock properties in models can offer new insights.

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Summary statistics of primary earners in 2001

| Primary Earner | | N | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|------------------|------------|-------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Age | Individual | 3,872 | 40.82 | 40 | 9.73 | 25 | 64 |
| | Family | 3,872 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Weekly hours | Individual | 3,872 | 40.09 | 40 | 13.09 | 0 | 120 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 53.01 | 47 | 32.39 | 0 | 201 |
| Weekly wage | Individual | 3,872 | 1,292.20 | 1,144.11 | 833.72 | 0.00 | 14,189.97 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 1,854.35 | 1,629.21 | 1,195.40 | 0.00 | 14,189.97 |
| Labour Income | Individual | 3,872 | 66,296.91 | 59,623.97 | 47,176.12 | 0.00 | 915,285.31 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 96,419.84 | 84,933.90 | 65,805.50 | 0.00 | 915,285.31 |
| Market income | Individual | 3,872 | 68,764.74 | 61,171.57 | 48,541.73 | -53,391.64 | 916,353.19 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 103,635.25 | 91,527.77 | 73,219.05 | -28,221.30 | 1.51e+06 |
| Private transfer | Individual | 3,872 | 414.57 | 0.00 | 2,450.85 | 0.00 | 36,611.41 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 605.10 | 0.00 | 3,016.12 | 0.00 | 44,543.89 |
| Total income tax | Individual | 3,872 | 16,818.29 | 12,684.33 | 18,900.91 | -3,252.31 | 391,345.50 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 23,958.07 | 17,950.27 | 26,017.05 | -8,808.10 | 637,691.50 |
| Public transfer | Individual | 3,872 | 2,366.43 | 0.00 | 5,257.32 | 0.00 | 47,440.77 |
| | Family | 3,872 | 5,276.89 | 0.00 | 8,855.15 | 0.00 | 69,825.59 |

Table 1: Summary statistics of primary earners in 2001. Note that, the values of income, tax liabilities and transfers are expressed in 2018 AUD.

Summary statistics of primary earners in 2020

| Primary Earner | | N | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|------------------|------------|-------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Age | Individual | 5,064 | 41.62 | 40 | 11.42 | 25 | 64 |
| | Family | 5,064 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Weekly hours | Individual | 5,064 | 38.39 | 40 | 12.17 | 0 | 137 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 53.17 | 48 | 30.83 | 0 | 227 |
| Weekly wage | Individual | 5,064 | 1,602.68 | 1,407.68 | 994.18 | 0.00 | 13,106.03 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 2,366.64 | 2,135.80 | 1,479.03 | 0.00 | 15,752.48 |
| Labour Income | Individual | 5,064 | 85,855.68 | 75,723.73 | 56,891.76 | 0.00 | 970,817.13 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 129,099.10 | 114,556.42 | 85,839.93 | 0.00 | 1.13e+06 |
| Market income | Individual | 5,064 | 88,836.96 | 77,665.37 | 60,488.81 | -42,502.38 | 970,817.13 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 139,555.66 | 121,949.19 | 102,986.36 | -42,016.96 | 2.74e+06 |
| Private transfer | Individual | 5,064 | 446.73 | 0.00 | 3,197.68 | 0.00 | 132,911.66 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 809.84 | 0.00 | 5,273.85 | 0.00 | 168,922.17 |
| Total income tax | Individual | 5,064 | 20,926.39 | 15,641.81 | 23,154.97 | -2,259.09 | 413,873.91 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 31,058.35 | 23,178.26 | 37,202.65 | -7,960.70 | 1.16e+06 |
| Public transfer | Individual | 5,064 | 2,133.53 | 0.00 | 5,764.68 | 0.00 | 72,231.70 |
| | Family | 5,064 | 5,205.20 | 0.00 | 10,679.92 | 0.00 | 97,191.41 |

Table 2: Summary statistics of primary earners in 2020. Note that, the values of income, tax liabilities and transfers are expressed in 2018 AUD.

Derive moments of shocks: Non-parametric approach

Purge age and time effects:

$$\log \text{income}_{i,t} = \text{age}_{i,t} + \text{age}_{i,t}^2 + \text{year}_t + \mu_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

Calculate the n^{th} -order differences of $\hat{\mu}_{i,t}$:

$$\Delta^n \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \hat{\mu}_{i,t} - \hat{\mu}_{i,t-n} \quad (2)$$

Group the residual shocks $\Delta^n \hat{\mu}_{i,t}$ by (i) *age* and (ii) *past income decile*.


Calculate moments of the shock distributions for each group:

$$\tilde{\mu}_{\Delta y}^k = \frac{E [(\Delta y - \mu_{\Delta y})^k]}{\sigma^k} \quad (3)$$

where $\tilde{\mu}_{\Delta y}^k :=$ the k^{th} standardized moment of y shocks (k^{th} -order risks).

See derivation of shock moments via [parametric approach in the appendix](#).

Empirical distribution of 3-year average residual earnings shocks



Summary of analytical framework

Summary of analytical framework:

1. Calculate moments of distributions of residual income changes (*risks*);
2. Decompose the moment estimates to study sources of risks (See appendix);
3. Examine the degree of insurance by family and government.

Decomposition: Dispersion of shocks




Figure: Variances of annual and 3-year average changes in usual weekly earnings, wages, and hours of primary earners

Wage and Hour changes vs. Earnings changes



Figure: Annual changes in residual weekly wages and hours versus decile of annual changes in residual usual weekly earnings for primary earners in the 1st, 5th, and 9th deciles of past usual weekly earnings

Family insurance against 2nd-order risk




Figure: Standard deviation of the distribution of annual changes of family income (P1-P99) at different levels.

Government insurance against 2nd-order risk




Figure: Standard deviation of the distribution of annual changes of post-tax and disposable (or post-government) family income (P1-P99) at different levels.

Family insurance against 3rd- and 4th-order risks




Figure: Standardized Skewness (top) and Kurtosis (bottom) of the distribution of annual changes of family income (P1-P99) at different levels.

Government insurance against 3rd- and 4th-order risks




Figure: Standardized Skewness (top) and Kurtosis (bottom) of the distribution of annual changes of post-tax and disposable (or post-government) family income (P1-P99) at different levels.

Insurance against *transitory* shocks: Male vs. Female




Figure: Moment properties of the distributions of annual income shocks of male (left panel) and female (right panel) primary earners (P1-P99 Pearson statistics).

Insurance against *persistent* shocks: Male vs. Female




Figure: Moment properties of the distributions of 3-year average income shocks of male (left panel) and female (right panel) primary earners (P1-P99 Pearson statistics)

Spousal response vs Public transfer




Figure: Annual changes in spousal earnings and public transfers versus decile of annual changes in past market earnings of primary earners in the 1st, 5th, and 9th deciles of past regular market income.

Insurance against *transitory* shocks: Partnered vs. Lone parents




Figure: Moment properties of the distributions of annual income shocks of partnered (left panel) and lone (right panel) parents (P1-P99 pearson statistics)

Concluding remarks

Our findings on the dynamics of income suggest:


1. Similar earnings dynamics in Australia as in other OECD countries;
2. Some differences with regards to the sources of risks and insurance;
3. Understanding earnings risks and insurance against risks is crucial for designing optimal tax and transfer policies.

Future work:

1. Topics: retirees and age pension; consumption risk;
2. Data: Administrative data
3. Modelling: Mapping microdata to macroeconomic model

Appendix: Inequality and the role of government in Australia

Gini coefficients for equivalised income




Data: ABS (Microdata: Household Expenditure, Income and Housing, 2015-16, Cat. no. 6540.0, released 25/10/17) and ABS HES Basic confidentialised unit record files for years 1988-89 through 2009-10 as available at 25/10/17. **Source:** *Rising Inequality? A stocktake of the evidence (Productivity Commission, 2018)*.

See appendix for comparison between average annual income growth figures computed using (i) [static distributions by PC](#), and (ii) [our method](#).

Appendix: Average disposable income growth (PC)

Average equivalised disposable income by income decile, 1988-89 to 2015-16



Data: ABS (Microdata: Household Expenditure, Income and Housing, 2015-16, Cat. no. 6540.0, released 25/10/17) and ABS HES Basic confidentialised unit record file for 1988-89 as available at 25/10/17.

Source: *Rising inequality? A stocktake of the evidence* (Productivity Commission, 2018).

Appendix: Average annual growth of residual income by decile using equation 1

| Income Decile | N | Individual | Individual | Household | Household |
|---------------|--------|---------------|---------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | | Labour Income | Market Income | Pre-gov't Income | Disposable Income |
| 1 | 10,965 | 58.64% | 56.27% | 29.11% | 16.23% |
| 2 | 10,964 | 5.86% | 5.97% | 4.17% | 0.22% |
| 3 | 10,950 | -0.88% | -0.24% | 2.54% | -0.01% |
| 4 | 10,940 | -3.20% | -3.20% | -0.56% | -1.42% |
| 5 | 10,982 | -4.45% | -4.03% | -1.73% | 1.00% |
| 6 | 10,930 | -4.86% | -4.82% | -2.49% | -1.85% |
| 7 | 10,950 | -4.51% | -4.79% | -2.31% | -1.90% |
| 8 | 10,947 | -4.17% | -4.84% | -3.95% | -1.89% |
| 9 | 10,953 | -5.39% | -6.17% | -3.60% | -2.82% |
| 10 | 10,948 | -7.80% | -10.00% | -7.16% | -5.83% |

Table 3: Average Annual Residual Income Growth (2001-2020) of Employees. The growth statistics shown are for employees (not self-employed) age 25-64. The residual changes are obtained from controlling for time and age effects (see equation 1). The figures account for cross-decile mobility over time.

Appendix: Derive moments of shocks via parametric approach (1)

Consider a parsimonious model for the residual income in equation 1:

$$\hat{\mu}_{i,t} = z_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

$$z_{i,t} = z_{i,t-1} + \eta_{i,t} \quad (5)$$

where $\eta_{i,t}$ and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ are drawn from some distributions $F_\eta \sim (0, \sigma_\eta^2)$ and $F_\epsilon \sim (0, \sigma_\epsilon^2)$, respectively.

The n -year growth of $\hat{\mu}_{i,t}$ is thus:

$$\Delta^n \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \hat{\mu}_{i,t} - \hat{\mu}_{i,t-n} \quad (6)$$

$$= \sum_{j=t-n+1}^t \eta_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,t} - \epsilon_{i,t-n} \quad (7)$$

Appendix: Additional consideration

We use quantile-based measures of skewness and kurtosis for comparability with the previous studies.

$$S_{kelley} = \frac{(P_{90} - P_{50}) - (P_{50} - P_{10})}{P_{90} - P_{10}} \quad (11)$$

$$K_{crow-siddiqui} = \frac{P_{97.5} - P_{2.5}}{P_{75} - P_{25}} \quad (12)$$

We consider robust moment statistics: $P1-P99$, $P5-P95$, and $P10-P90$.

Alternatively, using [Arc-Percent Change method](#) yields similar results.

Appendix: Decompose earnings shocks (1)

We have:

$$y_{i,t} = w_{i,t} \times h_{i,t} \quad (13)$$

$$\implies \frac{\% \Delta y_{i,t}}{dt} = \frac{\% \Delta w_{i,t}}{dt} + \frac{\% \Delta h_{i,t}}{dt} \quad (14)$$

which can be simplified as

$$\Delta y = \Delta w + \Delta h \quad (15)$$

Let $\tilde{\mu}_z^k := \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{z - \mu_z}{\sigma_z} \right)^k$ and $\sigma_z := \sqrt{\text{var}(z)}$ for a random variable z .

Appendix: Volatility of shocks by income and age






Figure: Standard deviation of the distribution of changes in regular market earnings for primary earner (P1-P99)

Appendix: Decomposition (skewness and kurtosis)

Pearson Skewness



Pearson Kurtosis








Figure: Pearson Skewness and Pearson Kurtosis of annual average and 3-year average changes in usual weekly earnings, wages, and hours of main job of primary earners (at least 18 years of employment)

Appendix: Wage and Hour changes vs. Earnings changes

Annual changes



Average 3-year changes







Figure: Changes in residual weekly wages and hours versus decile of changes in residual usual weekly earnings for primary earners in the 1st, 5th, and 9th deciles of past usual weekly earnings

Appendix: Family insurance against 2nd-order risk

Annual changes



3-year average changes





Figure: Standard deviation of the distribution of annual and 3-year average changes of family income (P1-P99) at different levels. The figure captures the relative contribution of family market income and private transfer to the second-order risk of pre-government family income.

Appendix: Family insurance against 3rd- and 4th-order risks (1)

Pearson Skewness



Pearson Kurtosis





Figure: Skewness (top) and Kurtosis (bottom) of the distribution of annual changes of family income (P1-P99) at different levels. The figure captures the relative contribution of family market income and private transfer to the third- and fourth-order risks of pre-government family income.

Appendix: Family insurance against 3rd- and 4th-order risks (2)

Pearson Skewness




Pearson Kurtosis



Figure: Skewness (top) and Kurtosis (bottom) of the distribution of 3-year average changes of family income (P1-P99) at different levels. The figure captures the relative contribution of family market income and private transfer to the third- and fourth-order risks of pre-government family income.

Appendix: Gov't insurance against 2nd-order risks

Annual changes



3-year average changes




Figure: Standard deviation of the distribution of annual and 3-year average changes of post-tax and disposable (or post-government) family income (P1-P99) at different levels. The figure captures the relative contribution of tax and transfer to the second-order risk of disposable family income.

Appendix: Male vs. Female secondary earners

| Secondary Earner | Age | Higher Education | Hours (Weekly) | Wage (Weekly) | Market Income (Annual) | Govt Transfer (Annual) | |
|------------------|--------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| 1 | Male | 36 | 47% | 29.9 | \$619.43 | \$19,554.41 | \$10,633.30 |
| | Female | 34.4 | 47% | 25.3 | \$566.46 | \$21,166.45 | \$11,822.05 |
| 2 | Male | 38.3 | 57% | 35 | \$823.47 | \$40,572.98 | \$5,065.07 |
| | Female | 36.3 | 54% | 26.6 | \$664.96 | \$29,604.74 | \$6,705.75 |
| 3 | Male | 40.7 | 65% | 38 | \$959.69 | \$49,668.30 | \$3,046.49 |
| | Female | 38.6 | 58% | 29.6 | \$775.35 | \$38,089.68 | \$3,708.15 |
| 4 | Male | 42.3 | 73% | 40 | \$1,201.26 | \$65,238.51 | \$1,729.30 |
| | Female | 40 | 67% | 31.9 | \$958.34 | \$50,298.72 | \$1,670.62 |
| 5 | Male | 46.1 | 82% | 41.5 | \$1,670.71 | \$104,266.79 | \$885.92 |
| | Female | 42.9 | 76% | 33.9 | \$1,281.75 | \$74,134.83 | \$1,114.50 |

Table 4: Average 20-year statistics for male and female secondary earners by family market income quintile. All income and transfer values are stated in 2018 Australian dollar.

Appendix: Insurance against *transitory* shocks and parenthood




Figure: Moment properties of the distributions of annual income shocks of parent (left panel) and non-parent (right panel) primary earners (P1-P99 pearson statistics)

Appendix: Insurance against *persistent* shocks and parenthood




Figure: Moment properties of the distributions of 3-year average income shocks of parent (left panel) and non-parent (right panel) primary earners (P1-P99 pearson

Appendix: Age-profiles of work hours and LFP rate




Figure: M-shaped age-profiles of work hours (left panel) and LFP rate (right panel). Solid line for men, dashed line for women.

Appendix: Additional statistics

| Past decile | Age 25-34 | | Age 35-44 | | Age 45-54 | | Age 55-64 | | Total |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| | Part-time | Full-time | Part-time | Full-time | Part-time | Full-time | Part-time | Full-time | |
| 1 | 188 | 231 | 418 | 247 | 389 | 276 | 320 | 143 | 2,212 |
| | 53.56% | 6.90% | 48.21% | 3.64% | 44.20% | 3.81% | 45.58% | 4.40% | 9.44% |
| | 8.50% | 10.44% | 18.90% | 11.17% | 17.59% | 12.48% | 14.47% | 6.46% | 100.00% |
| 2 | 51 | 419 | 177 | 593 | 137 | 604 | 96 | 268 | 2,345 |
| | 14.53% | 12.51% | 20.42% | 8.73% | 15.57% | 8.34% | 13.68% | 8.24% | 10.01% |
| | 2.17% | 17.87% | 7.55% | 25.29% | 5.84% | 25.76% | 4.09% | 11.43% | 100.00% |
| 3 | 35 | 450 | 54 | 630 | 78 | 684 | 77 | 340 | 2,348 |
| | 9.97% | 13.43% | 6.23% | 9.28% | 8.86% | 9.44% | 10.97% | 10.45% | 10.02% |
| | 1.49% | 19.17% | 2.30% | 26.83% | 3.32% | 29.13% | 3.28% | 14.48% | 100.00% |
| 4 | 27 | 407 | 58 | 681 | 80 | 708 | 55 | 332 | 2,348 |
| | 7.69% | 12.15% | 6.69% | 10.03% | 9.09% | 9.77% | 7.83% | 10.21% | 10.02% |
| | 1.15% | 17.33% | 2.47% | 29.00% | 3.41% | 30.15% | 2.34% | 14.14% | 100.00% |
| 5 | 15 | 445 | 41 | 753 | 66 | 708 | 46 | 298 | 2,372 |
| | 4.27% | 13.28% | 4.73% | 11.09% | 7.50% | 9.77% | 6.55% | 9.16% | 10.12% |
| | 0.63% | 18.76% | 1.73% | 31.75% | 2.78% | 29.85% | 1.94% | 12.56% | 100.00% |
| 6 | 14 | 324 | 36 | 847 | 38 | 783 | 42 | 268 | 2,352 |
| | 3.99% | 9.67% | 4.15% | 12.47% | 4.32% | 10.81% | 5.98% | 8.24% | 10.03% |
| | 0.60% | 13.78% | 1.53% | 36.01% | 1.62% | 33.29% | 1.79% | 11.39% | 100.00% |
| 7 | 13 | 311 | 35 | 771 | 39 | 842 | 19 | 343 | 2,373 |
| | 3.70% | 9.28% | 4.04% | 11.35% | 4.43% | 11.62% | 2.71% | 10.54% | 10.12% |
| | 0.55% | 13.11% | 1.47% | 32.49% | 1.64% | 35.48% | 0.80% | 14.45% | 100.00% |
| 8 | 5 | 292 | 26 | 724 | 22 | 886 | 15 | 389 | 2,359 |
| | 1.42% | 8.72% | 3.00% | 10.66% | 2.50% | 12.23% | 2.14% | 11.96% | 10.06% |
| | 0.21% | 12.38% | 1.10% | 30.69% | 0.93% | 37.56% | 0.64% | 16.49% | 100.00% |
| 9 | 3 | 252 | 11 | 749 | 28 | 897 | 18 | 408 | 2,366 |
| | 0.85% | 7.52% | 1.27% | 11.03% | 3.18% | 12.38% | 2.56% | 12.54% | 10.09% |
| | 0.13% | 10.65% | 0.46% | 31.66% | 1.18% | 37.91% | 0.76% | 17.24% | 100.00% |
| 10 | 0 | 219 | 11 | 795 | 3 | 857 | 14 | 464 | 2,363 |
| | 0.00% | 6.54% | 1.27% | 11.71% | 0.34% | 11.83% | 1.99% | 14.26% | 10.08% |
| | 0.00% | 9.27% | 0.47% | 33.64% | 0.13% | 36.27% | 0.59% | 19.64% | 100.00% |
| Total | 351 | 3,350 | 867 | 6,790 | 880 | 7,245 | 702 | 3,253 | 23,438 |
| | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| | 1.50% | 14.29% | 3.70% | 28.97% | 3.75% | 30.91% | 3.00% | 13.88% | 100.00% |

Table 5: Proportion of primary earners in part-time employment by decile of usual weekly wages from main job. The subsample contains primary earners who report positive usual weekly labour earnings for at least 18 years of

Appendix: Additional statistics

| Past decile | Age 25-34 | | Age 35-44 | | Age 45-54 | | Age 55-64 | | Total |
|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| | Casual | Permanent | Casual | Permanent | Casual | Permanent | Casual | Permanent | |
| 1 | 113 | 306 | 130 | 535 | 135 | 532 | 116 | 347 | 2,214 |
| | 31.92% | 9.15% | 30.23% | 7.40% | 33.33% | 6.89% | 37.54% | 9.52% | 9.45% |
| | 5.10% | 13.82% | 5.87% | 24.16% | 6.10% | 24.03% | 5.24% | 15.67% | 100.00% |
| 2 | 51 | 419 | 58 | 713 | 64 | 677 | 51 | 313 | 2,346 |
| | 14.41% | 12.52% | 13.49% | 9.86% | 15.80% | 8.77% | 16.50% | 8.58% | 10.01% |
| | 2.17% | 17.86% | 2.47% | 30.39% | 2.73% | 28.86% | 2.17% | 13.34% | 100.00% |
| 3 | 52 | 433 | 51 | 633 | 47 | 715 | 36 | 381 | 2,348 |
| | 14.69% | 12.94% | 11.86% | 8.76% | 11.60% | 9.26% | 11.65% | 10.45% | 10.02% |
| | 2.21% | 18.44% | 2.17% | 26.96% | 2.00% | 30.45% | 1.53% | 16.23% | 100.00% |
| 4 | 26 | 408 | 35 | 705 | 38 | 750 | 20 | 367 | 2,349 |
| | 7.34% | 12.19% | 8.14% | 9.75% | 9.38% | 9.71% | 6.47% | 10.07% | 10.02% |
| | 1.11% | 17.37% | 1.49% | 30.01% | 1.62% | 31.93% | 0.85% | 15.62% | 100.00% |
| 5 | 23 | 437 | 23 | 770 | 24 | 750 | 14 | 330 | 2,371 |
| | 6.50% | 13.06% | 5.35% | 10.65% | 5.93% | 9.71% | 4.53% | 9.05% | 10.12% |
| | 0.97% | 18.43% | 0.97% | 32.48% | 1.01% | 31.63% | 0.59% | 13.92% | 100.00% |
| 6 | 15 | 323 | 26 | 857 | 16 | 805 | 14 | 296 | 2,352 |
| | 4.24% | 9.65% | 6.05% | 11.86% | 3.95% | 10.42% | 4.53% | 8.12% | 10.03% |
| | 0.64% | 13.73% | 1.11% | 36.44% | 0.68% | 34.23% | 0.60% | 12.59% | 100.00% |
| 7 | 15 | 309 | 16 | 790 | 16 | 865 | 17 | 345 | 2,373 |
| | 4.24% | 9.23% | 3.72% | 10.93% | 3.95% | 11.20% | 5.50% | 9.46% | 10.12% |
| | 0.63% | 13.02% | 0.67% | 33.29% | 0.67% | 36.45% | 0.72% | 14.54% | 100.00% |
| 8 | 15 | 282 | 21 | 729 | 15 | 893 | 7 | 397 | 2,359 |
| | 4.24% | 8.43% | 4.88% | 10.09% | 3.70% | 11.56% | 2.27% | 10.89% | 10.06% |
| | 0.64% | 11.95% | 0.89% | 30.90% | 0.64% | 37.86% | 0.30% | 16.83% | 100.00% |
| 9 | 26 | 228 | 19 | 741 | 20 | 905 | 9 | 417 | 2,365 |
| | 7.34% | 6.81% | 4.42% | 10.25% | 4.94% | 11.72% | 2.91% | 11.44% | 10.09% |
| | 1.10% | 9.64% | 0.80% | 31.33% | 0.85% | 38.27% | 0.38% | 17.63% | 100.00% |
| 10 | 18 | 201 | 51 | 755 | 30 | 830 | 25 | 453 | 2,363 |
| | 5.08% | 6.01% | 11.86% | 10.45% | 7.41% | 10.75% | 8.09% | 12.42% | 10.08% |
| | 0.76% | 8.51% | 2.16% | 31.95% | 1.27% | 35.12% | 1.06% | 19.17% | 100.00% |
| Total | 354 | 3,346 | 430 | 7,228 | 405 | 7,722 | 309 | 3,646 | 23,440 |
| | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| | 1.51% | 14.27% | 1.83% | 30.84% | 1.73% | 32.94% | 1.32% | 15.55% | 100.00% |

Table 6: Proportion of primary earners in casual employment by decile of usual weekly wages from main job. The subsample contains primary earners who report positive usual weekly labour earnings for at least 18 years of observation.

Appendix: Additional statistics

| Income Quintile | Parenthood | Married | | Single | | Total |
|-----------------|------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | | Male | Female | Male | Female | |
| Q1 | Non-parent | 143 | 455 | 238 | 177 | 1,013 |
| | | 4.34% | 12.14% | 21.38% | 19.39% | 11.17% |
| | | 14.12% | 44.92% | 23.49% | 17.47% | 100.00% |
| | Parent | 167 | 809 | 12 | 117 | 1,105 |
| | | 5.07% | 21.58% | 1.08% | 12.81% | 12.18% |
| | | 15.11% | 73.21% | 1.09% | 10.59% | 100.00% |
| Q2 | Non-parent | 200 | 407 | 319 | 217 | 1,143 |
| | | 6.07% | 10.86% | 28.66% | 23.77% | 12.60% |
| | | 17.50% | 35.61% | 27.91% | 18.99% | 100.00% |
| | Parent | 234 | 597 | 1 | 32 | 864 |
| | | 7.10% | 15.93% | 0.09% | 3.50% | 9.53% |
| | | 27.08% | 69.10% | 0.12% | 3.70% | 100.00% |
| Q3 | Non-parent | 327 | 379 | 261 | 179 | 1,146 |
| | | 9.92% | 10.11% | 23.45% | 19.61% | 12.64% |
| | | 28.53% | 33.07% | 22.77% | 15.62% | 100.00% |
| | Parent | 399 | 386 | 2 | 19 | 806 |
| | | 12.11% | 10.30% | 0.18% | 2.08% | 8.89% |
| | | 49.50% | 47.89% | 0.25% | 2.36% | 100.00% |
| Q4 | Non-parent | 361 | 255 | 165 | 120 | 901 |
| | | 10.95% | 6.80% | 14.82% | 13.14% | 9.93% |
| | | 40.07% | 28.30% | 18.31% | 13.32% | 100.00% |
| | Parent | 548 | 219 | 2 | 1 | 770 |
| | | 16.63% | 5.84% | 0.18% | 0.11% | 8.49% |
| | | 71.17% | 28.44% | 0.26% | 0.13% | 100.00% |
| Q5 | Non-parent | 349 | 129 | 111 | 51 | 640 |
| | | 10.59% | 3.44% | 9.97% | 5.59% | 7.06% |
| | | 54.53% | 20.16% | 17.34% | 7.97% | 100.00% |
| | Parent | 568 | 112 | 2 | 0 | 682 |
| | | 17.23% | 2.99% | 0.18% | 0.00% | 7.52% |
| | | 83.28% | 16.42% | 0.29% | 0.00% | 100.00% |
| Total | | 3,296 | 3,748 | 1,113 | 913 | 9,070 |
| | | % 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| | | % 36.34% | 41.32% | 12.27% | 10.07% | 100.00% |

Table 7: Cross-tabulation of frequencies between parenthood, marital status, and gender. Since HILDA tracks individuals and their households over time, we present a snapshot of the first cohort entering the survey in 2001. The table suggests a negative assortative matching (or matching of unlike) between higher income males and lower

Appendix: Additional statistics

| Highest education attained | Married | | Single | | Total |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Male | Female | Male | Female | |
| High school or lower | 1,226 | 2,227 | 639 | 494 | 4,586 |
| | 37.20% | 59.45% | 57.41% | 54.11% | 50.57% |
| | 26.73% | 48.56% | 13.93% | 10.77% | 100.00% |
| Above high school, at most bachelor's degree | 1,741 | 1,221 | 424 | 350 | 3,736 |
| | 52.82% | 32.59% | 38.10% | 38.34% | 41.20% |
| | 46.60% | 32.68% | 11.35% | 9.37% | 100.00% |
| Above bachelor's degree, at most post-graduate degree | 329 | 298 | 50 | 69 | 746 |
| | 9.98% | 7.96% | 4.49% | 7.56% | 8.23% |
| | 44.10% | 39.95% | 6.70% | 9.25% | 100.00% |
| Total | 3,296 | 3,746 | 1,113 | 913 | 9,068 |
| % | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| % | 36.35% | 41.31% | 12.27% | 10.07% | 100.00% |

Table 8: Cross-tabulation of frequency between education, marital status, and gender. Since HILDA tracks individuals and their households over time, we present a snapshot of the first cohort entering the survey in 2001. The table suggests a negative assortative matching (or matching of unlike) between higher education males and lower education females. The observed pattern becomes less pronounced in later years of the survey, partly due to attrition and the inclusion of new and younger households

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